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ABSTRACT
Global economic imbalances have continued to widen in recent years,
reaching unprecedented levels, and are now one of the major issues in
international economics. This paper begins by taking a closer look at the
evolution of imbalances since the turn of the decade. It is clear that we are
now facing a very different situation to the 1980’s, the last time imbalances
were a major concern. While the United States continues to represent one
side of global imbalances — the US current account deficit has almost
tripled since the turn of the decade, and reached a new record low of over
$800 billion (6.1 per cent of GDP) last year — the surplus economies are
now a numerous and increasingly diverse group of countries, making any
potential adjustment process more complicated. The focus then turns to
the theories that have been put forward to explain the significant increase
in imbalances that has taken place. These reveal that a range of factors has
played a role, and the responsibility of the deterioration is truly a global
one. Finally, the paper turns to the sustainability issue, and finds that a
number of issues raise question marks over how sustainable the current
position is. These include the role that cyclical factors have played in
supporting imbalances, the sharp deterioration in the US external debt
position that has occurred, and an expectation that the terms on which
foreigners are willing to hold US assets will have to change. Despite
considerable debate over the issue, this suggests that some risk of a
disorderly adjustment exists, although this risk can be minimised by a
number of policies being introduced across the globe.
1. Introduction
International imbalances have widened substantially over the last
decade, against the backdrop of expanding global trade and
rapid financial market integration. On one side of the imbalance
issue is the US economy, where investment has been
substantially higher than savings since the mid-1990’s, resulting
in a rapid expansion of the economy’s current account deficit.
On the other side is a diverse group of countries — most notably
developed and developing Asian economies, and oil exporters —
who have recorded sizeable surplus savings, and have been
willing to use these savings to purchase significant quantities of
US assets. As a result, despite net US external debt increasing
substantially from $500 billion in 1995 to over $2.5 trillion last
year, the world’s largest economy has had no difficulties in
finding foreign funds to finance ongoing excess investment.
The sustainability of this situation has become one of the most
debated issues in economics in recent years. While it is widely
accepted that the current trend cannot continue indefinitely,
there is considerable disagreement over whether it can persist in
the long-term (see for example Cooper, 2006, and Dooley et al.,
1 The author is an economist in the Bank’s European Monetary Affairs and International
Relations Department. The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the author and
are not necessarily those held by the CBFSAI or the European System of Central Banks. The
author would particularly like to thank John Flynn for all of his help, and Jenny Osborne
and Brian Golden for their very useful comments.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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2006) or whether an adjustment must take place in the coming
years (Krugman 2006). Similarly, amongst those who anticipate
an adjustment, there is a divergence of views over whether this
adjustment will be gradual and benign (Cavallo and Tille, 2006,
and CBO, 2007) or rapid and disorderly (Obstfeld and Rogoff,
2005, Roubini and Setser, 2004).
Against this background, this paper aims to take a closer look at
the imbalances issue. We begin in section 2 with a brief
introduction of the current account; those already familiar with
balance of payments concepts may wish to move straight to
section 3, which takes a detailed look at developments in the
principal deficit and surplus countries in recent years. Section 4
outlines four contrasting theories that have been put forward to
explain the emergence of imbalances, while section 5 and 6 look
to the future, focusing on the sustainability issue and also the
risks of a disorderly adjustment taking place. Reflecting the range
of factors that have driven imbalances, their impact on US
external debt and the potential for financing problems in the
future, the paper concludes that there are significant question
marks over future sustainability. Furthermore, while it is possible
that a benign market based adjustment will take place, there is
also a risk of a much sharper correction. This risk, however, can
be minimised by authorities around the globe being pro-active,
and introducing a range of necessary policies as soon as possible.
2. Introducing the Current and Financial
Accounts
The current account balance of a country measures the
difference between the value of exports and imports of goods,
services and international transfers. A deficit indicates that a
country is spending more than it is earning on these items. In
order to finance such a position, the country must either sell
domestic assets, run down its previously acquired stock of
foreign assets or increase liabilities to non-residents. On the other
hand, a current account surplus implies an excess of foreign
receipts over domestic expenditure on current account items. In
this case, a country will find itself adding to its stock of foreign
assets or reducing its foreign liabilities.
In fundamental terms, the current account balance of a country
summarises the difference between domestic saving and
domestic investment by the public and private sectors. In
essence, therefore, the current account balance can be viewed
as representing the domestic savings gap (see box 1). By
extension, a country’s foreign investment will also be related to
the difference between domestic savings and investment. A
country invests abroad when its domestic savings are more than
sufficient to finance domestic investment expenditure. In this
instance, the stream of surplus savings generates a capitalQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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Box 1: The current account and the domestic savings gap
We can use the national income accounting framework to illustrate the
relationship that exists between savings, investment and the current
account. To begin with, we break gross domestic product (GDP) down
into its expenditure components; private consumption (C), private
investment (I), government purchases of goods and services (G) and
exports (X) less imports (M). This provides us with equation (1) below:
(1) GDP = C + I + G + X − M
As well as recording a country’s total expenditure on goods and services,
GDP also measures the total income generated in the economy. More
detailed reasoning for this can be found in any standard economic
textbook. Focusing on this latter definition allows us to rewrite equation
(1). We can identify four possible uses for income; it can be used for
consumption (C), savings (S), to pay tax (T), or it can be transferred abroad
(Tr). Accordingly, GDP can also be expressed as:
(2) GDP = C + S + T + Tr
Given the uniform left hand side variable in equations (1) and (2) we can
equate the two. Doing so and re-arranging the terms we get:
(3) X − M − Tr = ( S—I )+ (T − G)
In equation (3) X − M − Tr is the current account of the balance of
payments. The equation therefore reveals that the current account balance
is equal to the sum of the private saving gap (saving less investment) and
the government budget balance. In other words, the current account
balance is simply the difference between total domestic saving and
investment. A country that runs a current account deficit, will also have a
negative domestic savings gap (and vice versa).
We can also go a step further — using the same framework — to confirm
that a current account deficit will be offset by a capital and financial
account surplus. Equation (4) outlines the various uses of private savings;
private savings can be used to fund domestic investment, the government
budget deficit or, alternatively, can be invested in foreign assets (FA).
(4) S = I + (G − T) + FA
Rearranging the terms, we can write
(5) FA = (S − I) + (T − G) = X − M − Tr [From (3)]
This final equation confirms that the size of capital outflows/inflows will be
equal to the size of the current account surplus/deficit. It also confirms that
a country will accumulate foreign assets (i.e. experience capital outflows)
when domestic saving (both private and public) is more than sufficient to
fund domestic investment.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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outflow, making the country a net lender to the rest of the world.
A country that does not generate savings sufficient to finance its
own investment needs must attract surplus foreign savings in the
form of a capital inflow, making it a net borrower from the rest
of the world.
Thus, in terms of simple accounting, a current account deficit will
always be matched by an offsetting capital and financial account
surplus. Equating the current account position and the domestic
savings gap, however, is simply stating an accounting relationship
that must hold at the level of a national economy. It is not a
theory of how the current account position is determined or
evidence that the position is an equilibrium one. In behavioural
terms, a country’s ability to run a current account deficit depends
on the willingness of non-residents to acquire and hold an
offsetting amount of domestic assets/liabilities. Balance is
achieved by variations in the terms (exchange rate, interest rates,
asset prices) on which the assets/liabilities are offered and held.
For example, if its domestic assets are in demand, a country will
be able to fund its current account deficit on relatively favourable
terms and vice versa. As well as these flows aspects, however,
there are also stock issues to be considered. Sustained or rising
current account deficits imply that the stock of domestic assets
held by non-residents will grow over time. Thus, a country which
has run deficits for a long period will have a greater exposure to
portfolio shifts by non-resident investors.
3. Global Imbalances: The Stylised Facts
3.1 Recent Developments in the US Current Account
The US current account has been in deficit almost continuously
since the beginning of the 1980’s
2, but, as Chart 1 outlines, the
deterioration in the external position has accelerated sharply
over the past decade. From a deficit of $114 billion (or 1.5 per
cent of US GDP) in 1995, the current account deficit had more
than doubled to $300 billion (3.2 per cent of GDP) by the end
of the 1990’s, and following a brief improvement in 2001 —
against the backdrop of a moderation in economic activity — the
downward trend resumed once again. The external deficit
reached a new record high in each of the five years to 2006, a
trend that culminated in a deficit of $812 billion (6.1 per cent of
GDP) last year. To put the scale of this figure in context, it was
greater than the nominal value of the output produced by the
Irish, Belgian and Portuguese economies combined in the same
year.
Looking ahead, it appears that this run of record deficits will
continue, albeit at a slower pace. The US external balance is
expected to broadly stabilise over the medium term; in its latest
2 In fact, if one strips out significant transfer payments from the rest of the world to the US
in support of the war in Iraq in 1991, the US current account has been in deficit
continuously since 1982.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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WEO, the IMF (2007b) has forecast current account deficits of
$835 billion in 2007 and $866 billion in 2008 (or 6.1 and 6.0
per cent of GDP respectively). While this obviously represents a
positive development — particularly in comparison with previous
years — it is important to stress that, at such levels, US investment
would remain substantially higher than saving in the economy.
Furthermore, as we shall see later, a stabilisation in the external
deficit would not lead to a stabilisation in external borrowing; the


























Chart 1: US Current Account Balance
















Table 1 shows a breakdown of the US current account balance
since the beginning of the decade. In 2000, US imports of goods
and services exceeded exports of goods and services by almost
$380 billion, a figure that had doubled to $760 billion in
2006. Consistent and deteriorating trade deficits since the early
1990’s have reflected two key factors, positive growth
differentials in favour of the US, and until the start of this decade,
the strength of the US dollar; since peaking in early 2002, the
dollar’s nominal effective exchange rate has followed a broadly
downward trend, declining about 20 per cent by the middle of
this year. Positive growth differentials, on the other hand, which
determine the relative strength of US and foreign income growth,
continued broadly unabated until US economic activity
moderated in the second half of 2006. In fact, most of the period
since the turn of the decade saw not only robust US activity
levels support significant imports to the economy, but weaker
activity in other major economies — most notably the euro
area and in Japan — soften foreign demand for US goods and
services.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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Even if the US and the rest of the world had grown by a similar
level over this period, empirical evidence suggests that growth
of US imports would still have outpaced growth of US exports.
This reflects the fact that the responsiveness of US imports to
increases in US income has exceeded the responsiveness of US
exports to income growth in its trading partners in the past, the
so called Houthakker-Magee asymmetry. This helps to explain
why weaker US growth in the coming years is expected to have
only a limited impact on the external deficit in the IMF forecasts;
activity levels in the other advanced economies are predicted to
increase at a broadly similar level to the US. Focusing on the
other components of the current account, Table 1 also reveals
that the income account recorded surpluses throughout the
period, despite a sharp increase in US net external debt during
this time. This issue receives more attention in section 3.5, below.
Current transfers, meanwhile, have added to the deficit, as one
would expect in a major advanced economy.
Table 1: US Current Account Balance, 2000-2006 ($ billions)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Balance on goods and services −379·8 −365·1 −423·7 −496·9 −612·1 −714·4 −758·5
— Exports 1,070·6 1,004·9 974·7 1,017·8 1,157·3 1,283·1 1,445·7
— Imports −1,450·4 −1,370·0 −1,398·4 −1,514·7 −1,769·3 −1,997·4 −2,204·2
Balance on income account 21·1 31·7 27·7 45·4 56·4 48·1 36·6
— Inflows 350·9 290·8 281·2 320·6 401·9 505·5 650·5
— Outflows −329·9 −259·1 −253·5 −275·1 −345·6 −457·4 −613·8
Balance on unilateral transfers −58·6 −51·3 −63·6 −70·6 −84·4 −88·5 −89·6
Balance on current account −417.4 −384.7 −459.6 −522.1 −640.1 −754.8 −811.5
Current account as % of GDP −4.2 −3.8 −4.3 −4.7 −5.4 −5.9 −6.1
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Reuters Ecowin
Chart 2: Petroleum Trade Deficit, 2000-2006
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Finally, there is no question that higher oil prices have played a
significant role in boosting the US trade deficit in recent times.
In the first four years of this decade there was only a modest
difference between the total and non-petroleum trade deficits,
but since 2004 the gap between these two figures has widened
substantially; last year petroleum products accounted for almost
30 per cent of the total trade deficit (see Chart 2). Having
moderated in the second half of last year, oil prices picked up
significantly once again in the first six months of 2007, reaching
new record highs, and with futures markets not expecting Brent
crude oil prices to fall significantly from their current levels in the
coming years, it appears that future improvements to the current
account position via the petroleum channel will be limited.
3.2 Financing the US Current Account: The Surplus Countries
US current account deficits represent only one side of the global
imbalance issue; by definition, on the other side must be a group
of surplus countries, who are generating the capital outflows
necessary to finance the US deficit. Two notable trends in recent
years have been the significant increase in the magnitude of
current account surpluses, and also the fact that they have
become much more dispersed than in the past (see Table 2). The
present situation is significantly different from the 1980’s, when
imbalances were primarily a tri-polar affair, involving deficits in
the US, and surpluses in Japan and Germany. This greater
number of economies now involved would appear to
significantly complicate the issue of trying to orchestrate a
multilateral policy response. The growing level of cross border
financial flows has been facilitated by factors such as a reduction
in home bias, against the backdrop of a global financial system
that has become increasingly more integrated.
Table 2: Current Account Balances ($ billions)
3
Avg. Avg.
1996-00 2001-03 2004 2005 2006(e) 2007(f) 2008(f)
United States −239·9 −455·5 −640·1 −754·8 −811·5 −834·6 −866·1
Euro area 30·8 27·0 97·5 8·1 −29·1 −35·2 −50·6
Asia 155·4 211·2 348·4 416·4 517·5 570·6 614·7
— Japan 103·1 111·9 172·1 165·7 170·4 166·6 159·1
— NIA 32·8 51·1 83·9 79·9 87·0 88·1 89·6
— China 22·4 32·9 68·7 160·8 238·5 303·7 358·6
— Other Developing Asia −2·9 31·1 23·8 10·0 21·6 12·3 7·3
Oil producers 46·6 95·8 188·0 325·6 383·6 282·4 271·6
Sources: IMF (2007b), Bureau of Economic Analysis, author’s calculations.
Table 3 outlines the surpluses of these regions as a percentage
of the US deficit. From the data it is clear that the euro area has
played a far less significant role in the build up of global
imbalances in recent years, and even ran its own small current
3 NIA or Newly Industrialised Asian includes Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan. Oil
exporters include 10 of the 11 members of OPEC for whom data is available — Algeria,
Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and
Venezuela — and Russia.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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account deficit in 2006. The major suppliers of capital since the
start of the decade have been Asian and oil producing
economies; Asian economies are estimated to have run surpluses
that were the equivalent of 60 per cent of the US deficit last
year, with oil producers accounting for around 45 per cent of
the US figure
4. The former were led by developments in China,
who last year overtook Japan in running the largest surpluses in
the region. Chinese current account surpluses have increased
from around $30 billion at the beginning of the decade to an
estimated $240 billion last year, when they accounted for around
30 per cent of the US deficit. The Japanese and Newly
Industrialised Asian economies, meanwhile, have consistently run
large surpluses over the past decade, which on average have
represented approximately a quarter and a tenth of the US
external deficit respectively. Surpluses in oil-producing
economies, meanwhile, have accelerated even more rapidly than
those in China, against the backdrop of the rapid increase in
energy prices that has occurred since 2003. Oil producers’
current account balances are estimated to have more than
doubled since then to over $380 billion, with the percentage of
the US deficit that they account for also doubling from around
20 per cent. With regard to individual countries, the Saudi
Arabian and Russian economies ran the largest oil producer
surpluses in 2006, with both coming in at just under $100
billion.
Table 3: Current Account Surpluses as Percentage of US
Deficit (per cent)
Avg. Avg.
1996-00 2001-03 2004 2005 2006(e) 2007(f) 2008(f)
Euro area 12·8 5·9 15·2 1·1 −3·6 −4·2 −5·8
Asia 64·8 46·4 54·4 55·2 63·8 68·4 71·0
— Japan 43·0 24·6 26·9 22·0 21·0 20·0 18·4
— NIA 13·7 11·2 13·1 10·6 10·7 10·6 10·3
— China 9·3 7·2 10·7 21·3 29·4 36·4 41·4
— Other Developing Asia −0·4 6·8 3·7 1·3 2·7 1·5 0·8
Oil producers 19·4 21·0 29·4 43·1 47·3 33·8 31·4
Sources: IMF (2007b), Bureau of Economic Analysis, author’s calculations.
Tables 2 and 3 also include the latest IMF forecasts to outline
what is expected to happen in surplus countries in the coming
years. Two striking developments are expected to take place;
the Chinese external surplus is forecast to continue to accelerate
rapidly — increasing by 50 per cent between 2006 and 2008 —
and, as a result, will account for 40 per cent of the US deficit
next year. Furthermore, surpluses in oil producing countries are
expected to moderate by around a third, against the backdrop
of increased domestic spending; by 2008 they are forecast
to represent just over 30 per cent of the US current account
deficit.
4 The fact that the sum of these figures is in excess of 100 per cent reflects current account
deficits in other advanced and emerging economies that are not included in the tables, and
statistical discrepancies.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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3.3 Financing the US Current Account: The Financial Account
These developments — the growing importance of Asian capital
flows in financing the US current account throughout the
decade, and, more recently, the significance of oil-producing
economies — are also evident when focusing on the financial
account of the US balance of payments. As discussed in section
2, a current account deficit must be matched by a financial
account surplus, and as Table 4 confirms, net capital inflows to
the United States have been substantial since the start of the
decade, averaging almost $800 billion in 2005 and 2006. Two
important trends that have emerged in relation to the financing
of US external imbalances in recent years are the growing
importance of official flows — although private flows still
dominate — and the increase in debt related flows, which are
now more important than FDI and equity flows. A significant
increase in net official inflows — purchases of US assets
undertaken by foreign authorities — has occurred since the year
2002 (see Table 4). These inflows — which result in many cases
from heavily managed exchange rate policies — increased from
an average of $40 billion in the five years to 2002 to $400 billion
in 2004, growing from 10 per cent to 70 per cent of net capital
inflows over the same period. Furthermore, Table 5 shows that
the bulk of these official inflows have come from Asian economies.
While a more detailed breakdown on a country-by-country basis is
not available, the table shows that $310 billion, or almost 80 per
cent of official inflows originated from Asia in 2004.
Table 4: US Financial Account, 2000-2006 ($ billions)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
US owned assets abroad −560·5 −382·6 −294·6 −325·4 −905·0 −426·9 −1,055·2
— Official −1·2 −5·4 −3·3 2·1 4·5 19·6 7·7
— Private −559·3 −377·2 −291·3 −327·5 −909·5 −446·5 −1,062·9
Foreign owned assets in the US 1,046·9 782·9 797·8 864·4 1,461·8 1,204·2 1,859·6
— Official 42·8 28·1 115·9 278·1 397·8 259·3 440·3
— Private 1,004·1 754·8 681·9 586·3 1,064·0 945·0 1,419·3
Net capital flows 486·4 400·3 503·2 539·0 556·8 777·3 804·4
— Official 41·6 22·7 112·6 280·2 402·3 278·9 448·0
— Private 444.8 377.6 390.6 258.8 154.5 498.5 356.4
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
More recently, however, developments in official capital flows
have been somewhat more volatile. In 2005, as the Asian current
account surplus recorded a more modest increase and the
external balances of oil producing economies grew significantly,
net official inflows to the US moderated sharply (accounting for
just 35 per cent of total net capital inflows to the US). Unlike
Asian economies, whose authorities — up until that point —
tended to intervene directly in asset markets, a proportion of oil
producers’ revenues have been invested through private firms.
As can be seen from Table 6, however, capital continued to flow
into US Treasuries in 2005, despite the apparent decline in
official inflows, and the relatively low rates of return on offer from
US government securities.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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Table 5: Inflows of Official Capital to the US by Origin, 2000-
2006 ($ billions)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Asia 23·5 20·7 94·8 251·6 317·0 225·6 311·2
Europe 8·6 1·9 25·2 8·1 44·2 24·9 88·4
Latin America/Caribbean 7·8 6·1 −5·9 15·9 24·5 5·7 36·8
Other 2·9 −0·6 1·9 2·5 12·1 3·0 3·9
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
In 2006, as capital outflows from oil producing economies
increased at a more modest rate, and total Asian outflows
accelerated, net official inflows to the US picked up once again
(to represent 55 per cent of total inflows). It is also interesting to
note that the proportion of foreign inflows into treasury bonds
moderated to just 17 per cent last year. This suggests that foreign
authorities, which have concentrated their US investment in safe
government bonds in recent years, might now be seeking a
higher return by investing in other debt instruments. The fact that
over half of the decline of capital flowing into treasury bonds
went into corporate and agency bonds instead — which offer still
relatively safe returns — supports this view.
Table 6: Proportion of Net Foreign Purchases of US Securities
Represented by Each Security Class
Avg.
1997- 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
2001
Treasury Bonds 11 22 37 38 33 17
Agency Bonds 25 36 22 25 22 25
Corporate Bonds 39 33 37 34 37 44
Corporate Stocks 25 9538 1 3
Source: Reuters Ecowin, US Department of the Treasury
Turning to developments in foreign direct investment (FDI), flows
into the US economy have failed to recover to close to the levels
seen in the late 1990’s and earlier this decade, when optimism
about the ‘new economic paradigm’ — and the limitless
economic growth that it would bring — was at its peak (see Chart
3). From an average of $233 billion per year between 1998 and
2001, and a peak of $314 billion in the year 2000, FDI inflows
fell sharply in 2002 and 2003, as one would expect given the
weaker economic performance and increased uncertainty in
these years. However, more recently inflows have remained
relatively subdued, despite reasonable productivity growth in the
US economy. In 2005 FDI inflows amounted to just $100 billion,
and while they increased once again last year to $175 billion,
they remain well below the levels recorded at the turn of the
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3.4 Global Imbalances and Foreign Reserve Accumulation
One offshoot of the significant level of official outflows from
Asian and oil producing economies to the US has been a rapid
increase in foreign reserves in these countries. While, initially,
following the financial crises that took place in the 1990’s and
early 2000’s stronger foreign reserve accumulation may have
reflected a desire to self-insure against future crises, the size of
reserves have long surpassed the levels that would generally be
considered consistent with such a requirement. Increasingly
reserve accumulation has reflected export-led growth strategies
supported by tightly managed, undervalued exchange rates, and
factors related to the financial underdevelopment of emerging-
market economies. With regard to the latter of these factors, for
example, the excess of domestic savings over investment
combined with limited domestic financial intermediation
possibilities has led to large outflows of capital. With regard to
the former, most Asian countries either peg their currency to the
US dollar or limit its movements considerably. As Chart 4 reveals,
these developments have led to a surge in international reserve
accumulation in the major Asian economies. China surpassed
Japan as the largest foreign reserve accumulator in 2006, with
reserves totalling $1,046 billion; Japanese reserves stabilised but
remained substantial at $862 billion. Foreign reserves have also
picked-up steadily in the Newly Industrialised Asian economies
— Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan — and while they
remain low by comparison in oil producing economies, they
have nevertheless more than doubled there in the past five
years.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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3.5 The US Net International Investment Position
An obvious consequence for the US of running continuous
current account deficits — and subsequently importing
substantial levels of capital — has been a sharp increase in the
nation’s external debt, a development that is clearly evident from
the US Net International Investment Position (NIIP). The NIIP,
which is illustrated in Chart 5, is a cumulative measure of the
difference between the value of US external liabilities and its
external assets. Reflecting a history of current account surpluses
up until the early 1980’s, the NIIP did not move into deficit forQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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the first time until 1986, and a significant deterioration did not
occur until the middle of the last decade. Between 1996 and
2005 US external debt increased steadily, from $500 billion to
$2.2 trillion, and the NIIP reached a new record deficit of $2.5
trillion in 2006. Paradoxically, as we noted earlier, despite the
scale of this deterioration and the resulting significant net liability
position, the US economy has continuously experienced net
inflows of investment income (see Table 2). This is an issue that
we return to in more detail in section 5.
4. Why Have Imbalances Widened
The global economy has experienced a variety of positive and
negative episodes over the course of the last decade against the
backdrop of increased globalisation; these include the Asian
crisis, the new economy, and the bursting of the dot-com bubble
and subsequent recovery. As section 3 outlined, however, an
almost constant development over this period has been an
increase in global imbalances. A number of theories have been
put forward to explain why this widening has taken place, with
different commentators focusing on different aspects. Some see
the driving forces as coming from within the US — reflecting for
example the savings behaviour of agents in the economy, or its
robust productivity performance, while others focus on
developments outside the world’s largest economy — such as the
impact of strong growth and exchange rate strategies in
emerging market economies coupled with financial globalisation.
In this section we outline four of the most popular theories. Two
of these — the deterioration in US savings, and the emergence
of a global liquidity glut — focus on the underlying savings-
investment balance that was outlined in section 2. Another
hypothesis, which focuses on the strength of the US economy as
a favourable investment location, suggests that large trade
imbalances are being driven by capital flow developments, while
a fourth hypothesis, the Bretton Woods II theory, claims that a
new international monetary system has emerged. These theories
present mixed evidence over the sustainability of imbalances.
4.1 The Decline in US Savings
One factor that is often cited as being a key cause behind the
deterioration in the US current account balance is a deficient
level of US savings, a view that suggests that it is the US that is
primarily responsible for the current level of global imbalances.
Recall from equation 3 in Box 1 that the current account is equal
to the sum of the private savings gap (saving less investment)
and the government budget balance. As a result, economic
theory tells us that a negative private savings gap (which can be
caused by either low savings or high investment), a government
budget deficit or a combination of the two can result in an
economy running a current account deficit. According to IMF
data, gross US savings have declined significantly since the turnQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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of the decade, falling from 18 per cent of GDP in 2000 to just
12.9 per cent in 2005, before picking up somewhat last year. By
comparison, with the exception of France — where a small
decline has taken place — gross savings in the other G7 countries
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To analyse why this decline has taken place we must look at
sectoral data, which reveals that weaker savings has primarily
reflected a significant increase in household borrowing. Chart 6
outlines net sectoral borrowing (saving less investment)
developments, for the period 1995 to 2006. The chart reveals
that the private savings gap has been negative over this entire
period, while the public savings gap has been in almost constant
deficit since 2002. Taking a closer look at developments in the
private sector, we can observe two fairly distinct periods. The
first of these, in the second half of the 1990’s saw both corporate
and household borrowing increase almost in step; higher
corporate borrowing during this period reflected the ‘new
economy’ investment boom, while household borrowing was
supported by significant positive wealth effects as the stock-
market surged. The second period, which began in the year
2000, saw the increase in the private savings gap being primarily
driven by higher household borrowing. Corporate borrowing fell
significantly as stock market valuations declined, and businesses
found themselves over-indebted and capital heavy to such an
extent that it took until late 2003 for their borrowing to begin
to trend upwards once again. Household borrowing, however,
continued to accelerate as the decade progressed as the
negative impact of the stock market crash on household wealth
was compensated for by the impact of lower interest rates inQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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boosting house prices. Between 2001 and 2005 net borrowing
by the household sector almost doubled, surpassing $1.2 trillion,
before moderating significantly over the course of 2006, as
concerns about the housing market developed. This shift in the
driving forces behind the private savings gap — and the sharp
decline in business investment spending that took place — is
particularly evident from Chart 7, which outlines US household
spending, residential investment and business investment as a
percentage of GDP over the last 10 years.
As Chart 6 makes clear, the second period also corresponded
with a significant turn-around in the US fiscal position, and a
return of the ‘twin deficits’ of the 1980’s; combined external and
fiscal deficits. Although they are not as significant in volume
terms as private savings, government surpluses at the time would
at least have helped the overall saving position. However, from
surpluses of 2.4 and 1.3 per cent of GDP in 2000 and 2001
respectively, the US budget balance fell into deficit in 2002 as
sizeable tax cuts resulted in a significant decline in revenues, and
federal spending expanded at an elevated level. By 2004 the
fiscal deficit had reached an 11-year high of 3.6 per cent, and
while the budget position has improved in recent years against
the backdrop of soaring corporate profits, the IMF (2007d) has
nevertheless forecast general government deficits of around 2.0
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Chart 7: US Household Spending and Business Investment
Percent of GDP
Source: Reuters EcoWin.
This evidence suggests quite clearly that US private savings have
weakened significantly over the last decade, with the move from
surplus to deficit on the part of the public sector adding to this.
The question is whether this low rate of saving is sustainable in
the years ahead. Given the housing market slowdown currentlyQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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being experienced by the economy, and the negative impact that
this is likely to have on household wealth, one would expect that
the very low private savings rate will have to correct.
4.2 The Global Liquidity Glut
A second theory that focuses on underlying saving and
investment developments, suggests that global imbalances
primarily reflect economic policies and developments outside of
the US. This theory was introduced by current Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke in a speech in early 2005; Bernanke
(2005) suggested that a combination of diverse factors had led
to the emergence of a global savings glut, which explained both
the increase in the US current account deficit and also the low
levels of long-term real interest rates that persist today. In essence
this theory is a reversal of that discussed in section 4.1; instead
of imbalances being driven by low US saving, it suggests that
they have actually been driven by excess savings in the rest of
the world over the past decade. This, according to Bernanke, in
turn reflects the strong saving motive of developed countries
with ageing populations, but more significantly a ‘metamorphosis
of the developing world from a net user to a net supplier of
funds to international capital markets’. Bernanke suggests higher
savings in developing economies can be explained by a range of
factors. These include a response to the series of financial crises
of the mid-1990’s — after which emerging market nations ‘were
forced into strategies for managing international capital flows’
and built up substantial foreign reserves — and the sharp increase
in energy prices. Other important factors that have subsequently
been mentioned by other commentators include the lack of a
social safety net and limited domestic credit facilities,
which encourage families to save in order to make future
durable purchases.
The real strength of the global savings glut theory is that, as noted
above, it also explains the very low level of world interest rates
that have been evident since 2002 — the factor which Bernanke
gives most credit to reducing US savings in recent years. From
1996 to 2000 he notes that higher equity prices played a key
equilibrating role in international financial markets, as capital
flowed into the US economy searching for higher returns; the
subsequent positive wealth effects and expectations of high
income growth resulted in a sharp decline in US saving. After the
stock market decline the demand for financing waned around
the world, but global savings remained high reflecting the factors
noted above. As a result downward pressure was placed on
global interest rates, and the transmission mechanism of excess
liquidity to the US domestic saving behaviour switched to strong
gains in house prices and housing wealth. Bernanke notes that
housing wealth was easily accessible to US consumers through
cash out refinancing and home equity lines of credit. Focusing
on the data, Table 7 clearly outlines that global saving hasQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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increased since the mid-1990’s, and most of this has reflected
developments in emerging market economies.
Table 7: Gross Saving as a Percentage of GDP, 1992-2006
Average 1992-1996 Average 1997-2001 Average 2002-2006
Advanced Economies 21·5 21·5 19·3
US 15·4 17·7 13·5
Euro area 21·2 21·6 21·1
Japan 31·7 28·5 26·8
NIA 34·2 32·3 31·3
Developing Asia 32·9 32·1 38·3
Middle East 22·9 25·4 35·0
Africa 17·1 18·6 21·9
Source: IMF
More recently, the global liquidity glut theory has been
augmented to also take account of the very low levels of global
investment since the turn of the decade. In the same year as
Bernanke outlined the hypothesis, the IMF (2005b) noted that
‘unusually low investment rates across the globe are a
contributing factor to low real long-term interest rates’. Rajan
(2006) outlines a range of possible factors for this. These include
the consequences of past excessive investment during the boom
years in advanced economies, concerns in developing
economies about the past inadequacies of their financial systems
in allocating investment, political and economic uncertainty in
developing countries which has limited FDI there, and a possible
switch in the nature of investment from hard physical assets —
like plant and equipment — to items like training and research
and development that are not as easily tracked. In Rajan’s view,
overall investment restraint is the real macroeconomic
conundrum, and his position is that the problem of the excess of
desired savings over realised investment is better described as
investment restraint rather than a savings glut.
As Table 8 reveals, the data also tends to support the IMF’s view.
Investment in advanced economies has declined only marginally
from the start of the 1990’s, but the decline that has taken place
overwhelmingly reflects developments in Asia; investment
spending in Japan and the NIA’s has fallen by around 6 per cent
of GDP from the levels recorded in the five years to 1996, while
even incorporating rapid investment growth in China — 45 per
cent of GDP in 2004 — investment in developing Asia as a whole
remains at the levels witnessed prior to the Asian crisis, pointing
to cautious developments elsewhere. In the Middle East,
meanwhile, investment has remained broadly unchanged despite
substantial inflows of oil revenue. This may reflect a reluctance
of a number of these economies to repeat the mistakes made in
the late 1970’s, when following a normalisation of energy prices,
governments were faced with significant fiscal deficits.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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Table 8: Gross Investment as a Percentage of GDP, 1992-
2006
Average 1992-1996 Average 1997-2001 Average 2002-2006
Advanced Economies 21·9 21·7 20·4
US 18·2 20·1 19·2
Euro area 21·4 21·1 20·5
Japan 29·3 25·9 23·3
NIA 32·6 27·9 25·3
Developing Asia 34·9 30·5 34·9
Middle East 23·9 22·0 22·7
Africa 19·8 20·0 21·2
Source: IMF
4.3 The Strength of the US Economy as an Investment
Location
Turning away from saving and investment developments, this
theory suggests that the current level of global imbalances is not
being driven by insufficient US saving, but rather by the
desirability of the US economy as a destination for foreign
investment. As in the case of the global liquidity glut, this
suggests that it is the decision making of non-US residents that
has driven the surge in the US external deficit. It is certainly
possible that the direction of causality could flow this way; as
outlined in section 2, a financial account surplus must be
matched by a current account deficit, and there are a number of
reasons why sharp net inflows of foreign capital should result in
growth in domestic expenditure. We would expect strong
foreign demand for a country’s assets to lead to an appreciation
in that country’s currency, making its imports relatively cheaper
and exports more expensive. Strong foreign demand should also
push up stock prices — leading to positive wealth effects, place
downward pressure on bond yields and in the case of direct
investment create job opportunities, all factors that one would
expect to boost private consumption. When inflows are spent on
investment, meanwhile, the productive capacity of the economy
should increase, leading to further strong capital inflows in the
future.
Proponents of this theory initially suggested that sharp inflows of
foreign capital reflected the strength of rapid productivity growth
in the US. Given the strength of optimism surrounding the
economic outlook there in the late 1990’s, it certainly appears
that return maximising decisions by non-US investors played a
significant role in driving the current account deficit at the turn
of the decade. As Table 9 reveals, significant productivity growth
differentials emerged between the US and the other major
economies at the time, and as Chart 3 and Table 6 show, a
substantial amount of the capital flowing into the US at the time
was invested directly or used to purchase corporate equity.
In more recent years, however, as hopes of a ‘new economy’
have dissipated, the evidence no longer suggests that the
substantial US current account deficit is being driven by privateQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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foreign investors seeking to maximise returns. This partly reflects
a reversal in the developments noted above; there has been a
moderation in US productivity growth in recent years, while the
proportion of foreign capital flowing into riskier US assets has
declined significantly. Initially strong flows into US Treasury
bonds might have reflected a flight to security against the
backdrop of weaker global growth, but it persisted even as US
stock markets rebounded (see Table 6). We have also seen
official inflows of capital playing an increasingly important role in
financing the US deficit, and clearly foreign authorities have not
been investing substantial funds in low yielding US treasury
bonds in order to maximise their returns.
Table 9: Labour Productivity for the Total Economy; Growth
in the Major Economies, 1998-2007
Avg.
1998-2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007(f)
US 2·0 2·5 2·8 1·6 1·5 1·0
Euro area 0·7 0·4 0·9 0·5 1·2 1·2
Japan 0·9 1·6 2·5 1·5 1·8 2·2
UK 1·9 1·7 2·2 1·0 1·9 1·7
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, June 2007
Reflecting this evidence, many supporters of the view that global
imbalances reflect the desirability of the US as an investment
destination have augmented their view to take a wider
perspective. Cooper (2006), for example, suggests that the US
remains an appealing destination for foreign investment not only
because of the attractiveness of US financial assets, but also
because of demographic trends in other developed and, in many
cases, developing countries. Cooper claims that an ageing
society in these countries limits the prospects for significant
future increases in domestic investment — and therefore
productivity growth — and as a result these economies’ future
needs can only be met by profitable external investment. In the
US, by comparison, the author notes that there is the prospect
for a continued rise in population in the coming years, reflecting
both a higher fertility rate and continuing significant immigration.
As a result US investment spending and productivity growth
should remain robust in the medium to long term, and the
country will continue to offer superior higher risk-adjusted
returns. Others have suggested that the desirability of the US
economy does not just reflect the high quality of assets available,
but also other factors. Clarida (2005) suggests that the US
external deficit reflects a deficit of growth and growth prospects
in much of the rest of the world, especially the rest of the G7.
However, he concludes that ‘the United States, because of the
role of the dollar as a vehicular currency, because of the depth
and breadth of the US financial markets, and because of the
credibility of US monetary policy, is destined for some time . . . to
run a structural international capital inflow, and thus a structuralQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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current account deficit’. Having acknowledged that higher
realised returns do not drive US capital inflows, meanwhile,
Forbes (2007) outlines a number of reasons why foreign private
sector investors may choose to purchase US assets. These
include a more highly developed, liquid and efficient financial
sector; strong corporate governance, accounting standards and
institutions; low information costs due to familiarity; the reserve
status of the dollar; and possibly even an advantage amongst US
based investors, which helps them earn higher returns than their
foreign counterparts. Given that these factors should continue to
support strong net inflows of foreign capital into the US
economy, Cooper notes that ‘the US current account deficit . . .
is likely to remain large for some years to come’.
Box 2: Dark matter and the debate over US external assets
As noted in Section 3.5, while the US net liability position has deteriorated
significantly over the past decade, the US economy continued to
experience positive net inflows of investment income until last year. This
apparent paradox is at the centre of the controversial ‘dark matter’
hypothesis, developed by Hausmann and Sturzenegger (H&S, 2005). H&S
claim that, measuring the value of US external assets on the basis of the
income generated, the US has actually been a net creditor since the 1980’s
rather than a net debtor. ‘Dark matter’ is what the authors refer to as the
gap between the official balance of payments data — which they believe
has failed to accurately measure the true value of US assets overseas —
and their own measurement of net assets. In their own words ‘dark matter
. . . corresponds to assets we know exist, since they generate revenue but
cannot be seen or better said, cannot be properly measured’. The most
notable source suggested by H&S is superior US ‘know how’, evident from
a consistently higher rate of return on US FDI as compared to foreign FDI
in the US. However, the dark matter hypothesis has been the subject of
significant criticism. Most significantly, H&S make the very heroic key
assumption that all investments earn the same rate of return. If this is not
the case, there is no reason why net investment income cannot be positive
even when a country is a net debtor. In reality this appears to be what has
happened in the US. In the words of Gourinchas and Rey (2005), the US
has benefited from the ‘privileges of the issuer of the international currency
. . . being able to borrow short and lend long’, a privilege that saw the US
experience a positive return differential. This issue is discussed in more
detail in section 5.
4.4 The Bretton Woods II Argument
A final theory which has received a significant amount of
attention in recent years is the Bretton Woods II (BW2)
argument, devised by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber
(2003, hereafter DFG). DFG suggest that a new de facto Bretton
Woods regime of fixed exchange rates has emerged in the
international monetary system, and this will allow the US to
continue to run sizeable current account deficits for a prolonged
period. In the 1950’s, two large ‘periphery’ economies, Europe
and Japan, adopted a development strategy based on exports to
a ‘central economy’, the United States. The strategy was
supported by the Bretton Woods (BW1) system of fixed
exchange rates — under which foreign currencies were pegged
to the dollar at fixed parities — which ensured exports from theQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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periphery economies remained competitive. Today, DFG claim
that a similar scenario is playing out, albeit one with somewhat
different players. The central economy remains the US, but a
new periphery — consisting of a number of Asian economies —
has adopted an export led growth strategy to support its
development. While DFG acknowledge that no formal exchange
rate system exists, countries in the periphery have ensured that
they remain competitive by heavily managing their currencies
against the US dollar (the so called BW2 arrangement), a
development that has resulted in the periphery accumulating
substantial levels of external reserves. Of course, today a third
group of countries also exist; labelled ‘the capital account
economies’ and consisting of Europe, Canada and Latin America,
these economies allow their currencies to float freely, and
accordingly are the ones DFG believe are most likely to face the
burden of adjustment under the current arrangement.
DFG suggest that the current system is sustainable into the long
run because even when the current important periphery
countries develop and move to fully floating exchange rates — a
point that is not expected to be reached for ‘perhaps ten more
years’, the clear success of the strategy will lead other developing
countries — most notably India — to follow the same path and
‘graduate to the periphery’. In the authors words ‘the Bretton
Woods system does not evolve, it just occasionally reloads a
periphery’.
The BW2 theory certainly captures recent developments in the
global economy. No one can question that many Asian countries
have, and continue to, manage the fluctuations in their
currencies against the US dollar, in a manner consistent with
export-led growth strategies. The result of this behaviour has
been a sharp increase in these economies’ external reserves, the
recycling of which has spurred foreign official demand for US
assets, and ensured bond yields have remained close to record
lows. However, it is less clear that the current arrangement is
sustainable, particularly over the medium-term. The authors
themselves note in their most recent paper that while ‘a general
acceptance of the [BW2] view [has developed] in financial
markets . . . this is much less true of the academic and official
sector’.
Barry Eichengreen (2004), for example, stresses the significant
differences that exist between the original BW1 arrangement and
the current international monetary system. The most notable of
these reflects the nature of the periphery countries themselves;
today the periphery represents numerous heterogeneous
economies, making it less likely that they will be able to
subordinate their individual interest to collective interest. He also
notes that today there is no commitment from US policymakers
to maintain the value of their currency. Goldstein and Lardy
(2005), in comparison, focus on one of the key members of theQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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periphery, China, and outline why ‘the China portrayed in BW2
is not consistent with several important trends in, and features
of, the Chinese economy’. In particular, more than half of China’s
exports go to markets whose currencies are not pegged to the
US currency. They also believe that BW2 underestimates the
costs of sterilisation, and that it sets out a faulty development
strategy for China, where the pace of financial reform must be
accelerated and greater flexibility introduced to the exchange
rate in order to promote financial stability. Roubini and Setser
(2004) take a broader view of BW2 that is no less critical, and
incorporates some of the points noted above. The authors
believe that the current regime is highly unstable and
unsustainable, as it will place an increasingly large strain on the
global economy in the coming years. In particular, significant
protectionist pressures would emerge in the US and the capital
account countries, while the regime would also place an
increasing strain on the periphery countries themselves. These
strains would not only be felt on domestic financial systems, but
also in relationships amongst the peripheries.
4.5 Why Have Global Imbalances Widened?
The theories outlined above have typically been presented as
independent of one another. In reality, however, given the
complexity of the global economy, it is unlikely that only one
factor has led to the emergence of substantial imbalances. Many
factors have presumably been of significance, and accordingly, it
is probable that all of the above theories are relevant to some
degree. This is the view now taken by a number of
commentators, most notably the IMF (2005a), who note that
since the stock market correction in 2000 a number of factors
have been at play in supporting imbalances. Similarly, more
recent papers by Barry Eichengreen (2006) and Nouriel Roubini
(2006) have concluded that a range of factors has driven global
imbalances.
5. How Sustainable are Global Imbalances?
Having outlined the current extent of global imbalances, and
reviewed a range of theories that attempt to explain why
imbalances have widened over the last decade, this paper now
turns its attention to the future. Looking ahead, the present
situation, which sees capital flowing from developing economies
to already capital rich advanced economies, is unlikely to persist
indefinitely, although there is no consensus over when an
adjustment will have to take place. In this section, however, the
article outlines a number of factors that suggest that a move
towards a more sustainable level may have to occur in the
medium term.
5.1 The Positive Impact of Structural Shifts
A number of structural shifts have taken place over the last
decade that have been supportive of an increase in cross-borderQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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capital flows, and have facilitated expanding external imbalances.
Returning to one of the theories outlined in section 4, for
example, the emergence of the global savings glut reflects a
number of these structural factors: rapid increases in global
financial integration, the reduction of home bias, a prolonged
period of robust global growth — most notably in emerging
economies, and the uneven pace of financial market and social
security developments in said economies. Against the backdrop
of greater financial globalisation, we would expect to see an
increase in the number of countries with external surpluses or
deficits, and bigger imbalances than we have seen in the past.
However as Geithner (2006) has noted, just because it is possible
does not mean that it is prudent for the US to continue
borrowing on this scale, and there are a number of compelling
factors that suggest that imbalances have reached unsustainable
levels and will have to adjust downwards in the coming years.
5.2 Reversing Cyclical Effects
Alongside the structural shifts outlined above, positive cyclical
factors have also been highly supportive of growing imbalances.
By their very nature we would expect these cyclical factors to
dissipate over time, and there is growing evidence that this
process has begun and will intensify in the coming years. Section
4 outlined two of the more notable of these factors; very weak
saving in the US economy, and weaker than usual investment
outside of the US. Low private saving in the US has been
supported by the positive impact of booming asset prices on
household wealth since the turn of the decade, and in particular
the strength of house price growth. Between 2000 and 2006,
national house price growth in the US
5 averaged almost 9 per
cent per annum, peaking at 13 per cent in 2005. Since early
2006, however, the slowdown in the growth rate has been
notable. House prices expanded by just 3 per cent in annual
terms in the second quarter of the year, and are expected to
decline before 2007 comes to a close, as indicators from the
sector remain extremely weak, and concerns about subprime
mortgages have spiralled. Against such a background, one would
expect household savings to pick up, particularly given the very
low base that they are starting from. Very low investment outside
of the US also appears unsustainable over a prolonged period,
particularly given the current environment of robust global
growth. Table 8 revealed that global investment was weaker in
the period 2002 to 2006 than in the first half of the 1990’s for
many regions. However, more recently there is evidence that a
gradual upward trend has been established, an upward trend that
the IMF’s projections suggest will continue this year and next.
5 These house price figures are based on the Office for Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO) house price index.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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5.3 Expanding US External Debt
Focusing on the external debt implications of the US running
uninterrupted current account deficits also raises sustainability
questions. As outlined in section 3, the US net international
investment position (NIIP) has deteriorated rapidly over the last
decade, falling from $500 billion in 1996 to $2.5 trillion last year
(or from 6 to 19 per cent of GDP). However, the situation would
have been significantly worse, but for valuation effects limiting
the expansion of the NIIP in recent years. In particular, a weaker
US dollar has reduced the external burden by around $200
billion in the past three years (as is discussed in more detail
below, the US is in a unique position of borrowing in its own
currency, so a dollar depreciation weakens its external liabilities),
while the strength of equity markets in Asia and Europe relative
to those in the US has subtracted $1 trillion from the US external
debt position. As Higgins et al. (2006) note, however, this latter
valuation channel cannot be expected to persist in the coming
years as typically ‘changes in US and foreign stock prices have
been highly correlated’ and ‘[this] historical pattern is likely to
reassert itself in the future’. In fact, between 1998 and 2003,
asset price changes actually increased the burden of US debt
marginally. Accordingly, the deterioration in the US external debt
position is likely to accelerate in the coming years.
It is important to note that even if the US current account were
to stabilise in the coming years — as the major international
organisations expect — this would still imply a substantial
increase in the country’s external debt position. This is clearly
illustrated in an earlier paper by the same authors, Higgins et al.
(2005), which outlines how rapidly external debt can build up.
The authors consider alternative current account scenarios,
assuming that US nominal GDP growth proceeds at its recent
average of 5 per cent per annum, and exchange rates and the
rate of return on assets and liabilities remain unchanged. In a
scenario where the US current account deficit remains
unchanged at 6 per cent, the authors find that net US external
liabilities triple to 65 per cent of GDP by 2015, and 89 per cent
by 2025. Even if the US current account was to decline smoothly
to 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2015, meanwhile, the authors find
that US external debt would reach 50 per cent of GDP by that
year, and remain at that level in the following decade.
It is also important to note that the composition of US
expenditure since the turn of the decade — outlined in detail in
section 3 — will make the burden of repaying this debt more
difficult for the US economy. External deficits in the late 1990’s
partly reflected a significant increase in corporate borrowing to
finance investment, enhancing the productive capacity of the
economy. Since the bursting of the dot com bubble in 2000,
however, foreign borrowing has primarily financed increased
consumer and government spending. Consequently, from a
position at the turn of the decade where capital inflows wereQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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partly adding to the economy’s capital stock, inflows into the US
economy over the past five years have had a modest positive
impact on the economy’s productive capital stock.
5.4 The Conundrum of the US Income Account
As we noted in section 3, an apparent paradox has emerged
relating to the US income account. Despite the significant
deterioration that has taken place in the NIIP in recent years,
the US economy has continuously experienced net inflows of
investment income (see Table 1); while the NIIP recorded a
deficit of $2.6 trillion in 2006, inflows of investment income to
the US were nevertheless $37 billion greater than outflows to
foreigners holding US assets, developments that seem somewhat
inconsistent with one another. How has the US economy
continued to benefit from net income inflows? The answer
reflects the differing compositions of US assets and liabilities. As
Heath (2007) notes, the US has a positive net external equity
balance and a negative net external debt balance, and the
income yield on the former has been higher than the income
yield on the latter. Furthermore, the US net income balance has
experienced a persistent positive income yield on FDI. Table 10
breaks down US external assets and liabilities in 2005 by security
type. The table indicates that the level of demand for portfolio
debt securities differs significantly between the US and the rest
of the world. These debt securities make up just 10 per cent of
US owned foreign assets, with foreign direct investment and
equities accounting for 33 and 25 per cent respectively. The
composition of foreign-owned assets in the United States, on the
other hand, is dominated by interest sensitive securities, a
significant development when one considers the lower rate of
returns offered by these ‘safer’ assets. Interest sensitive securities
account for 33 per cent of the total, while foreign direct
investment and equities make up just 22 and 17 per cent
respectively. This differing composition has allowed the US
economy to experience a positive return differential.
Table 10: US External Assets and Liabilities, 2005 (per cent)
Assets Liabilities
Portfolio debt 9·9 33·1
Portfolio equity 25·4 17·0
FDI 32·6 21·6
Other investment 30·2 28·3
Source — Heath (2007)
Will this positive trend continue? It appears unlikely. While the
overall increase in the US NIIP figure has been significant in the
last decade, the increase in gross asset and liability flows has
been even more substantial; gross liabilities amounted to over
$16 trillion in 2006. This continuing increase in liabilities should
soon push the US income account into deficit, and as a result
income flows will begin to add to the current account deficit,Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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rather than subtract from it as it is doing now, reinforcing the
deterioration in the US net liability position.
5.5 Increasing Financing Costs
As section 3 outlined, the US economy has found little difficulty
in financing its external deficits, receiving substantial inflows of
foreign capital. But looking to the future, can it continue to do
so at such favourable terms? There is no question that there will
always be a strong underlying demand for US assets, irrespective
of the returns on offer. This reflects the many desirable features
of US markets that were outlined in section 4, most notably the
currency’s reserve status, and the depth and liquidity of US
markets. However, given the implications for the debt profile,
and the required increase in concentration of US assets in foreign
portfolios, there is a question as to whether the structural
demand for US assets is consistent with current account deficits
of around 6 per cent of GDP. As a result, there may have to be
an increase in the incentive for investors to continue to purchase
US assets in the coming years. This belief reflects a number of
factors. In particular, while a decrease in home bias has made
investors more willing to hold foreign assets, US assets appear to
have increased significantly as a proportion of portfolios. BIS data
shows that almost a quarter of all debt securities issued in 2005
and 2006, and half of all corporate debt securities issued in this
period, originated in the US. At some point, investors could well
require higher returns to continue to purchase US assets,
particularly as the exchange rate risk involved increases with
exposure to a particular currency. As section 3 outlined, there
are also tentative signs that official capital flows, which have
played such an important financing role, may start to chase
higher returns. There is still no firm evidence of these central
banks diversifying out of dollars, but they do now seem to be
paying more attention to the value of, and possible risks related
to, their balance sheets. If official flows to the US were to
moderate, it would place more emphasis on private investors,
reinforcing the point made above.
Roubini (2006) notes that in 2005 the conditions were perfect
for the private sector to play a bigger role in financing the US
external deficit; the Fed was tightening while the ECB and the
Bank of Japan were on hold; the US economy was growing much
faster than Europe’s and Japan’s; the Homeland Investment Act
heavily subsidised the repatriation of US profits abroad; and the
dollar was rising, providing capital gains to foreign holders of US
dollar assets. Yet, gross private purchases of US assets actually
declined marginally. Now the environment is very different. US
growth is slowing with growing concerns over the economic
outlook, while risk generally has been repriced upwards. Against
this backdrop there is a risk that private investors may become
less willing to continue to increase holdings of US assets
significantly without receiving higher returns. Higher financingQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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costs in the US would presumably have a negative impact on
domestic activity, placing downward pressure on imbalances.
6. Adjustment Possibilities
If global imbalances have reached an unsustainable level, and
must adjust downwards, the question emerges of whether this
correction will be benign or disorderly. Just as in the case of
sustainability itself, there is considerable debate amongst
commentators who expect an adjustment as to which is more
likely to occur. What does appear clear, however, is that the risk
of an abrupt correction could be minimised by economies
around the globe being proactive and adopting a number of
necessary policies. There has been some limited progress on
introducing these policy reforms in recent years, but given the
financial stability implications of a disorderly correction, much
more needs to be done.
6.1 How Will Imbalances Adjust?
With global imbalances being driven by trade flows, ultimately
any adjustment must come via changes in price (exchange rate)
and/or income (growth rate) differentials across countries. A lot
of attention has been placed on the substantial benefit that the
US would appear to hold in this regard; the majority of its foreign
borrowing is denominated in its own currency, while the bulk of
its foreign assets are in foreign currencies. As a result, a
depreciation of the US dollar should not only reduce future
external debt accumulation (by reducing the US current account
deficit), but also lead to a decline in the value of the economy’s
existing debt burden. However, more recently Goldberg and
Dillon (2007) have noted that a number of factors may blunt the
pass through of deprecation, in particular the near exclusive use
of dollars in invoicing US trade, foreign exporter’s market share
concerns, and the unusually high distribution costs added to US
imports.
Looking at previous adjustment episodes, empirical evidence
suggests that both exchange rate and growth developments have
played important roles in the rebalancing process. Recent work
by the IMF (2007c) is particularly novel as it not only analyses
episodes of current account deficit reversals over the past forty
years, but also surplus reversals over this period. With regard to
the former, it identifies 42 previous episodes in advanced
economies, and finds that while ‘changes in growth differentials
clearly play a role in the adjustment, real depreciation can help
smooth the impact of slowing domestic demand’. There has been
‘a clear trade-off’ between the growth slowdown that an
economy has experienced after the reversal and total real
effective exchange rate depreciation; ‘simple regression analysis
suggests that a ten per cent total real effective exchange rate
depreciation has been associated with a half percentage pointQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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lower average decline in GDP growth after the reversal’. Turning
to surplus countries, meanwhile, the IMF identifies 100 episodes
of large and sustained reversals in the global economy in the last
four decades. It finds that for non-oil exporters, surplus reversals
have been associated with both acceleration in real GDP growth
and a real exchange rate appreciation. However, only for the
advanced economies does a trade-off exist between the
adjustments in these two variables; ‘for emerging markets a
stronger real appreciation does not reduce the magnitude of the
increase in output growth associated with the reversal’. In oil
exporting economies, on the other hand, the adjustment process
has occurred with both a substantial slowdown in GDP growth
and a large total real appreciation of their currencies. The sharp
decline of the external surplus has reflected a negative terms-of-
trade effect, but the currency continued to strengthen in real
terms, as domestic demand and inflation remained robust.
There are some question marks over how relevant past
experiences may be for the current episode, as the two are not
directly comparable; the present situation is unique in terms of
scale, geographical composition (in terms of the role of emerging
market economies and oil exporting countries) and financial
characteristics (in terms of the role of official reserves
accumulation). In addition, asset prices and wealth effects have
played a much larger role in the recent build-up of imbalances
than has been the case in the past. Thus, one cannot overly rely
on the past to infer what future adjustment dynamics might be.
Furthermore, as Algieri and Bracke (2007) stress, the average
trends noted above ‘mask an unusually large degree of
heterogeneity’, and as a result ‘any meaningful inference [from
the past is] difficult’. While their focus is limited to deficit
countries, they find that in around a third of their seventy-one
adjustment episodes economic growth actually strengthened,
while also in one-third of cases, the real effective exchange rate
appreciated rather than depreciated. In conclusion they note that
this confirms that there is ‘no single route of current account
adjustment’ and ‘various combinations of relative growth rotation
and exchange rate adjustment appear possible in the context of
current account adjustment’.
6.2 Will the Adjustment be Benign?
If we assume that global imbalances are unsustainable at their
current levels, the next issue that arises is whether the necessary
adjustment will be disorderly or benign. Just as in the case of the
sustainability issue, however, there is no consensus over how this
process will occur, even amongst commentators who agree that
imbalances must moderate over the medium term. Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2005), for example, find that any adjustment will require
substantial changes in global exchange rates, that would,
presumably, have significant implications for global activity. In
their baseline scenario, where current accounts in three regionsQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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— the US, Asia and Europe — all go to zero, the dollar’s real
effective exchange rate needs to depreciate by 33 per cent
6; real
currencies in Asia and Europe would need to appreciate by 35
and 28 per cent against the US dollar respectively. If, however,
Asian economies were to continue to peg against the US dollar,
the real value of European currencies would have to rise by
almost 50 per cent against the dollar.
Paul Krugman (2006) believes that there will be ‘a Wile E Coyote
moment, when investors realise that the dollar’s value doesn’t
make sense, and that value plunges’, but suggests that in the
medium-term the US economy will be insulated from harm as it
can trade off weaker domestic demand for higher exports.
However, his analysis suggests that the transition to this new
equilibrium could involve a US recession in the short run. He
notes that this would occur if the contractionary effect of a burst
housing bubble (given the significant positive impact housing has
had on wealth effects) arrived quicker than the expansionary
effect of dollar depreciation, and recent developments in the US
housing market would appear to raise the possibility of this
occuring.
The Congressional Budget Office (2007) notes that both soft and
hard landings are possible, but find the former ‘the more likely
scenario’. The CBO reviews studies of past currency crises, and
find that these have tended to occur in emerging economies
and in countries with managed exchange rate systems. They also
suggest that the unique role of the US dollar reduces the
probability of a sudden stop in foreign financing, both because
nearly all US international liabilities are denominated in dollars,
and because there will always be a basic level of demand for the
currency. Furthermore, even in the case of a sudden stop of
foreign financing (a hard landing), the CBO suggests that the
resulting slowdown in economic activity may be limited,
reflecting the strength of US financial markets and the ability of
US entities to borrow in their own currency. This would ensure
that a currency crash would not inflate US borrowers’ debt
burden.
A common view that connects most commentaries is an
agreement that the risks of a disorderly market based adjustment
can be minimised if a range of macroeconomic policies are
introduced. Using their Global Economy Model (GEM), the IMF
(2005b) finds that an orderly adjustment can take place if non-
US residents are willing to continue to increase their holdings of
US assets for a considerable period without demanding a large
risk premium, even while the value of these assets are being
eroded by a weaker dollar. When a number of policies are
introduced, however, the IMF not only finds that the risks of a
6 This figure, and the others taken from the paper, are in addition to the currency movements
that took place in the period 2002 to 2004.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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disorderly adjustment are reduced, but the overall outcome for
the global economy is significantly better. They incorporate
increased exchange rate flexibility in emerging Asia, faster fiscal
consolidation in the US, and growth enhancing structural reforms
in the euro area and Japan into GEM and find that:
 Global imbalances and the build up in US net foreign
liabilities would be significantly reduced;
 Global growth would be better balanced and significantly
higher over the medium term, reflecting both lower global
interest rates and stronger productivity growth in the euro
area and Japan;
 Each individual region would also be better off. Emerging
Asia’s consumption would increase, consumption and
growth would be higher in the euro area and Japan, and
the US would face lower risks of a decline in appetite for
domestic assets. The rest of the world would also benefit
from more appreciated real exchange rates and lower
world interest rates.
Reflecting these findings, the IMF announced in June 2006 that
it was to begin multilateral consultations (MC) on global
imbalances, involving ‘systematically important members and
groups of members’; China, the euro area, Japan, Saudi Arabia
and the US. The aim of the consultations was to provide a forum
for debate amongst the parties, and enable them to agree on
policy actions. In April 2007 a review of the MC process took
place. The five participants and the IMF staff noted that ‘the
consultation process has proved a useful initiative...t h e
discussions have been open and constructive’ and the
implementation of their policy plans ‘would in combination
constitute a significant further step towards sustaining solid
economic growth and resolving imbalances’. The coming months
will show how serious the international participants are in
reducing imbalances. Policy plans to be introduced include:
 Speeding up financial reform, further improving the
exchange rate regime and boosting domestic demand — in
particular consumption — in China;
 Further reform of product, labour and financial markets in
the euro area;
 Strengthening competition, facilitating inward FDI, labour
market reforms and advancing fiscal consolidation in Japan;
 Increased investment — in both the hydrocarbon sector and
more general infrastructure — in Saudi Arabia;
 Further fiscal consolidation, reforming the budget process
to contain spending growth, introducing tax incentives to
support private saving and enhancing energy efficiency in
the US.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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7. Conclusions
Global economic imbalances have increased substantially over
the course of the last decade. On one side of the issue is the US
economy, whose current account deficit increased to over $800
billion or 6 per cent of GDP in 2006. On the other side is a
diverse group of developed and emerging market economies
that run sizeable current account surpluses and finance this US
position. In particular, surpluses in developing Asian and oil
producing economies have grown rapidly since 2000, against the
backdrop of rapid economic growth and robust energy prices.
The net impact of these developments has been a substantial
increase in the US external debt position. In 2006 the US net
international investment position recorded a deficit of 19 per
cent of GDP, up from 6 per cent of GDP a decade earlier. With
imbalances forecast to stabilise at their current level in the
coming years, this debt position is expected to continue to
deteriorate, increasing the portion of future US wealth that goes
to the rest of the world.
The expansion of imbalances appears to have been driven by a
range of factors that have their origin both in the US and in the
rest of the world, so responsibility is shared and does not reflect
developments in one single country. Some of these factors are
structural in nature, such as increased financial integration, the
emergence of a global savings glut and very strong underlying
demand for US assets. Others represent cyclical developments,
including very low private savings in the US economy and weak
investment expenditure in the rest of the world. Policies have
also played a role; in particular developmental strategies based
around fixed or heavily managed exchange rates.
Given the magnitude of the flows involved, and also the
prolonged nature of the issue, it is no surprise that the
sustainability of global imbalances has become one of the most
debated issues in economics in recent years. The fact that the
US economy has had little difficulty in financing external deficits
up until now has led to benign views holding sway and also
explains the fairly benign reaction in financial markets to date.
However, while structural factors mean that the global economy
can now facilitate bigger capital flows, a range of issues point to
imbalances being unsustainable at their current level. Amongst
them are indications that the cyclical factors mentioned above
may be set to unwind, concerns over the impact that continued
imbalances will have on the US external debt position, and also
indications that there will have to be a change in the terms on
which foreigners are willing to hold US assets.
If imbalances have to adjust from their current levels, this raises
the issue of whether this adjustment will be benign or disorderly.
Again there is considerable debate over this issue, but whatQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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appears to be clear is that the risk of sharp correction exists,
which could involve sizeable exchange rate movements and
weaker global growth. The current environment, where the price
of risk is increasing and there are concerns over turbulence on
financial markets would appear to increase these risks. However,
this risk can be minimised if a range of policies are introduced
around the globe, policies that would not only have a favourable
impact on global imbalances, but would also more fundamentally
improve global growth prospects. There has been some limited
progress on introducing these policy reforms in recent years, but
much more needs to be done.
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